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I. INTRODUCTION
As biopharmaceutical forms of technology, vaccines constitute
one of the most important tools for the promotion and maintenance of
public health. Tolstoy famously wrote that [h]appy families are all
alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. 1 Vaccine
markets offer perhaps one of the most extreme embodiments of
Tolstoy s principle2 in the field of biopharmaceutical innovation.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V7.I1.4
*
Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, Center for
Health Law Studies and Center for Comparative and International Law. S.J.D.,
LL.M., Duke Law School. I am grateful to the participants at the Texas A&M
University Journal of Property Law 2019 Fall Symposium for helpful comments and
insights.
1. Much more structured arguments have been made formalizing a so-called
Anna Karenina principle in other academic areas. See, e.g., Dwayne R. J. Moor, The
Anna Karenina Principle Applied to Ecological Risk Assessments of Multiple
Stressors, 7 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: AN INT L J. 231 (2001).
2. Principle is used here in a non-formalized way, merely as an indication of
the narrative and prescriptive emphasis on the malfunctions of IP regimes in
connection with vaccine R&D, as opposed to the success stories or happy
narratives surrounding vaccines for which there is both demand and adequate
supply.
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Vaccines are often described as one of the most unprofitable types of
biopharmaceutical goods, under-incentivized from a research and
development ( R&D ) perspective, and routinely failing to attract
sufficient investment from traditional funders in biopharma.3 In this
sense, and despite the scientifically well-established value of vaccines
from a public health perspective, vaccine markets are often portrayed
as a collection of unhappy families.4 Yet, at least throughout the
developed world, there are plenty of examples of steadily profitable
vaccine markets, as is the case of recently developed vaccines
targeting the human papilloma virus ( HPV ).5
This Essay begins by mapping the dualism in vaccine R&D
and commercialization, describing both happy and unhappy
markets. It then connects the development of new vaccines with the
default legal regime to promote innovation in the biopharmaceutical
arena: the patent system. In exploring possible solutions for
transactional problems arising in connection with the development of
vaccine technology, this Essay asks whether the rights covering
vaccine technologies are best understood as property rights or as
something else. This inquiry is of course but a fragment of a much
larger interrogation of the nature and mechanics of intellectual
property systems: are intellectual property rights and rights arising
out of the grant of patents in particular more like property or akin to
something else? Arguing that under the current noncommittal position
of the Supreme Court there is room for understandings of patent rights
that are not property-centric,6 this Essay concludes by exploring how
less property-like protection in the form of a liability regime for
critical components of vaccine technology can remove some of the
most salient transactional obstacles to the development and
commercialization of new and better vaccines.

3. See, e.g., Ruth Young et al., Developing New Health Technologies for
Neglected Diseases: A Pipeline Portfolio Review and Cost Model, GATES OPEN
RESEARCH 1, 1 (Feb. 19, 2020), https://gatesopenresearch.org/articles/2-23/v2
[https://perma.cc/93N9-DSXG] (finding chronic and R&D lacunas for several
priority vaccines).
4. The term family applied here further reflects the fact that vaccines for certain
families or types of pathogens fare better than others. See infra Parts I.A B.
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1365 (2018).
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II. DUALISM IN VACCINE MARKETS
Vaccines have long been recognized in scientific literature and
practice as one of the most cost-effective ways of preventing and
mitigating the burden of disease.7 The development of vaccines
targeting new pathogens, as well as the improvement of existing
vaccines, remains a crucial component of the public health
preparedness perspective,8 as evidenced by the emphasis placed on
vaccine R&D during the COVID-19 pandemic.9
Some vaccines become commercially successful.10 For
instance, Merck s vaccine targeting HPV ( Gardasil ) has become a
best-seller, increasing its yearly revenue from $1.7 to $3.2 billion in
2018.11 The vast majority of vaccines for infectious diseases, however,
are deemed unprofitable by industry standards.12 These diseases,
7. See F.E. Andre et al., Vaccination Greatly Reduces Disease, Disability,
Death and Inequity Worldwide, BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 2, 2008),
https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/86/2/07-040089/en/
[https://perma.cc/5M2D-AS43]; Vanessa Rémy et al., Vaccination: The
Cornerstone of an Efficient Healthcare System, 3 J. MKT. ACCESS & HEALTH POL Y
27041 (2015), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.3402/jmahp.v3.27041?need
Access=true [https://perma.cc/S668-QDKM]. See also Bruce Gellin et al., Vaccines
as Tools for Advancing More than Public Health: Perspectives of a Former Director
of the National Vaccine Program Office, 32 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 283,
283 (2001), https://academic.oup.com/cid/article/32/2/283/320376 [https://perma.cc
/5WQ9-KE6N].
8. See, e.g., Peter F. Wright, Vaccine Preparedness
Are We Ready for the
Next Influenza Pandemic?, 358 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2540, 2540 (2008) ,
https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp0803650?articleTools=true
[https://perma.cc/JQ27-W5BQ] (discussing preparedness in connection with the
development of a universal flu vaccine).
9. See, e.g., Tung Thanh Le et al., The COVID-19 Vaccine Development
Landscape,
NATURE
REV.
DRUG
DISCOVERY
(Apr.
9,
2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41573-020-00073-5
[https://perma.cc/X7VFZFGT] (surveying numerous vaccine R&D vaccine efforts during the COVID-19
pandemic).
10. See, e.g., Bourree Lam, Vaccines Are Profitable, So What?, THE ATLANTIC
(Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/02/vaccinesare-profitable-so-what/385214/ [https://perma.cc/TLN2-G4P4].
11. See Trefis Team, Merck s $3 Billion Drug Jumped To 4x Growth Over
Previous
Year,
FORBES
(Oct.
4,
2019,
4:30
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2019/10/04/mercks-3-billion-drugjumped-to-4x-growth-over-previous-year/#5bc71e0c6294 [https://perma.cc/9ZBNHZ2K]; see also Ed Silverman, Switching to Newest HPV Vaccine Can Save Billions
in Health Care Costs, Study Says, STAT (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/04/18/sex-vaccine-merck-gardasil/
[https://perma.cc/GM3V-BZKX].
12. See, e.g., Luis Barreto, The Industry Perspective, in VACCINES: PREVENTING
DISEASE & PROTECTING HEALTH 304, 308 (Ciro A. de Quadros ed., 2004).
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which historically have affected populations located predominantly in
the Global South, are becoming increasingly globalized, as illustrated
by the recent outbreaks of Ebola, Zika, and COVID-19.13
Thus, vaccine markets present innovators, funders, and policyand lawmakers with a split landscape. A restricted number of vaccines
like Gardasil fare well under contemporary market-based
approaches and, in this sense, make for happy narratives within
the vaccine innovation ecosystem. But the majority of vaccines needed
to address the burden posed by infectious diseases makes for an
unhappy narrative for numerous reasons, ranging from scientific
(viruses mutate quickly, for instance) to market-driven (certain patient
populations are so small that, from the perspective of R&D funders,
return on investment is unlikely).14 The following sections provide an
account of this dualism.
A. Happy Markets
In a report to Congress in 2018, the Department of Health and
Human Services characterized the vaccine R&D ecosystem in the
United States as successful and as a well established enterprise,
which has brought innovative and new and improved vaccines to the
market. 15 At the time, there were over 120 vaccine candidates under
development, with R&D conducted in collaborative models involving
heterogenous players including the public sector, pharmaceutical
companies, universities, non-profit organizations, and the private
sector.16
The development of certain vaccines has always been a
priority in the United States.17 The best illustration of the alignment
13. See Lance Salker et al., Globalization and Infectious Diseases: A Review of
the
Linkages,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
(2004),
https://www.who.int/tdr/publications/documents/seb_topic3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HJ65-FJWK].
14. See generally Ana Santos Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines:
Takeaways from Recent Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE
170, 170 (2020).
15. U.S. DEP T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ENCOURAGING VACCINE
INNOVATION: PROMOTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF VACCINES THAT MINIMIZE THE
BURDEN OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN THE 21ST CENTURY REPORT TO CONGRESS 3
(Dec. 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/encouraging_vaccine_innovati
on_2018_final_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8DWW-VBD2]
[hereinafter
ENCOURAGING VACCINE INNOVATION].
16. Id. at 5 6.
17. Id. at 7 (noting that [p]ublic health priorities have historically been evident
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between public health imperatives and support for R&D is perhaps the
development of the first polio vaccine.18 Polio is a crippling disease
that may result in paralysis or death.19 Outbreaks of the disease
intensified from the late nineteenth century onwards, triggering a race
among scientists to develop competing vaccine candidates in the
1940s and early 1950s.20 In 1952, the disease, which affected between
25,000 and 50,000 people every year in the United States, killed 3,000
children.21 The first polio vaccine was made available in the United
States in 1955.22 By 1961, the rates of polio infection had dropped by
a factor of 17.23 Largely due to the R&D efforts that took place in the
mid-twentieth century,24 polio has been reduced by 99%.25
In addition to responding to pressing public health needs, the
race to develop a polio vaccine unfolded against an R&D and funding
backdrop that remains unmatched in the history of vaccine
development.26 The mid-twentieth century remains one of the golden
periods if not the golden period of vaccine development.27 Both
the number of licensed vaccine manufacturers and the number of new
vaccines entering the market remain unmatched. For instance, the
estimated number of vaccines commercialized in the 1940s was
to stakeholders due to the clear disease burden of many infectious agents (e.g., polio)
and public health demand for vaccines ).
18. See generally DAVID M. OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY 1 (2006).
19. Tuuli Hongisto, Poliomyelitis (polio), WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/health-topics/poliomyelitis#tab=tab_1
[https://perma.cc/F4SH-4UL5] (last visited June 12, 2020).
20. See Anda Baicus, History of Polio Vaccination, 1(4) WORLD J. VIROL. 108,
108 110 (2012).
21. Gilbert King, Salk, Sabin and the Race Against Polio, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Apr. 3, 2012), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/salk-sabin-and-the-raceagainst-polio-169813703/ [https://perma.cc/9ZHQ-C7BN].
22. Baicus, supra note 17, at 109.
23. Id. (reporting a drop in infection rates from 13.9 cases per 100,000 [people]
in 1954 to 0.8 cases per 100,000 [people] in 1961 in the United States).
24. Combined with immunization campaigns, as well as surveillance and
monitoring practices.
25. 10 Facts on Polio Eradication, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://www.who.int/features/factfiles/polio/en/
[https://perma.cc/E6WK-TPD5]
(last updated Apr. 2007).
26. See generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, A
REVIEW OF SELECTED FEDERAL VACCINE AND IMMUNIZATION POLICIES, BASED ON
CASE STUDIES OF PNEUMOCOCCAL VACCINE (1979) [hereinafter OTA REVIEW]
(describing the vaccine R&D landscape in the United States through the early and
mid-twentieth century).
27. Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L.
REV. 729, 738 744 (2019) [hereinafter Vaccine Race].
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around 60;28 at that point, the United States market had over 50
vaccine manufacturers, in sharp contrast with single digits from the
1990s onwards.29
In addition to the historical market(s) for vaccines in the 1940s
and 1950s,30 there are currently several vaccines with stable and
sizable markets. In the United States, the federal government
recommends the administration of certain vaccines to almost all
individuals based on age and medical indications.31 These include
vaccines against polio, tetanus, and measles, mumps, and rubella
(MMR).32 The Affordable Care Act imposes insurance coverage of the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC)-recommended vaccines, which in
practice translates into the inexistence of cost-sharing or co-pay
requirements for patients.33 The tandem created by federal
recommendation of vaccines and mandatory coverage thus fuels both
R&D and commercialization of vaccines falling under this umbrella.
Moreover, there are cases in which public- and private-sector
players are motived to engage in R&D even though the market is
short-lived or there are scientific impediments to vaccine
development. The example of flu vaccines is instructive. The
Affordable Care Act proviso covers existing flu vaccines, which have
to be developed each year to respond to mutating pathogens.34 On the
28. See KENDALL HOYT, LONG SHOT: VACCINES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE 180
86 (2012). See Rutschman, Vaccine Race, supra note 27, at 742; see also U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., VACCINES LICENSED FOR USE IN THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/vaccines/vaccines-licensed-useunited-states [https://perma.cc/8RU5-9JS3] (providing an overview of currently
licensed vaccines in the United States market).
29. Rutschman, supra note 14, at 174.
30. OSHINSKY, supra note 18, at 5 (considered transversally as to include
different types of vaccines and vaccine technology, as well as different pathogens
targeted by a multiplicity of R&D projects).
31. See U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, RECOMMENDED CHILD
AND ADOLESCENT IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE FOR AGES 18 YEARS OR YOUNGER,
UNITED STATES, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/hcp/imz/childadolescent.html (last reviewed Feb. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/BCD4-XZ54].
32. U.S. DEP T HEALTH HUM. SERV., VACCINES & IMMUNIZATIONS,
https://www.hhs.gov/programs/prevention-and-wellness/vaccines-andimmunizations/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z8FF-SCDU] (last reviewed Jan. 13,
2020).
33. See U.S. DEP T HEALTH HUM. SERV, WHERE AND HOW TO GET VACCINES,
https://www.hhs.gov/ash/oah/adolescent-development/physical-health-andnutrition/vaccines/where-and-how-to-get-vaccines/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6XGG-872U] (last reviewed Aug. 6, 2019).
34. See U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HOW THE AFFORDABLE
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other hand, universal flu vaccines have long posed scientific
challenges during R&D stages and have yet to be successfully
developed. Nevertheless, R&D in this area continues to attract interest
from the public and private sectors alike.35 While not very common,
this is not the only example of a field of vaccine R&D that remains
well-populated R&D on vaccine candidates targeting respiratory
syncytial virus, which causes mild symptoms in most patients but can
lead to severe consequences for infant and older populations,36 attracts
sustained interest from private-sector firms.37
Finally, as documented above, the recent success of Gardasil
speaks to the possibility of blockbusters in vaccine markets. However,
even blockbuster vaccines generate much less revenue than
blockbuster pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical products in other
areas. For instance, best-selling biologics generate tens of billions in
revenue the world s best-selling drug in any category, Humira, has
reached $20 billion globally.38 Gardasil, on the other hand, made
headlines for reaching $3 billion in revenue in 2018.39
Outside the happy scenarios surveyed above, this disparity
in revenue stream makes investment in vaccine R&D prospectively
unappealing to investors in the private sector. As the public sector
lacks the financial and infrastructural capacity to develop and
commercialize vaccines exclusively on its own, large R&D lacunas
and potentially serious public health consequences arise in

CARE ACT INCREASES ACCESS TO INFLUENZA VACCINATION FOR HEALTH CARE
PERSONNEL, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/toolkit/long-term-care/aca.htm [https://perma
.cc/DN3V-RUVJ] (last reviewed Nov. 2, 2020).
35. ENCOURAGING VACCINE INNOVATION, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that The
development of certain vaccines
for example, universal influenza vaccines and
respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) vaccines for infants is considered a high priority
as reflected in the number of companies working on these vaccine targets ).
36. U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, RESPIRATORY SYNCYTIAL
VIRUS INFECTION (RSV), https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/index.html [https://perma.cc/2N
XV-LP9F] (last reviewed June 26, 2018).
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., Alex Keown, AbbVie Raises 2019 Profit Target Amid Sliding
Global Humira Sales, BIOSPACE (July 26, 2019), https://www.biospace.com/article/
despite-sliding-global-humira-sales-abbvie-beasts-analysts-estimates/ [https://
perma.cc/HL3L-53YQ].
39. Trefis Team, Merck s $3 Billion Drug Jumped To 4x Growth Over Previous
Year, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2019, 4:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/great
speculations/2019/10/04/mercks-3-billion-drug-jumped-to-4x-growth-overprevious-year/#5bc71e0c6294 [https://perma.cc/9ZBN-HZ2K].
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connection with vaccines with estimated small markets. This Essay
now turns to these unhappy scenarios in vaccine R&D.
B. Unhappy Markets
In early 2020, a novel strain of coronavirus made headlines as
it spread across the world.40 As the magnitude of the outbreak became
apparent, the U.S. National Institutes of Health ( NIH ) were among
the first institutions funding the development of a coronavirus
vaccine.41 The director of the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases described the process of getting private-sector
companies to join the project as very difficult and very frustrating. 42
During the very early stages of the coronavirus outbreak, no large
pharmaceutical company expressed interest in partnering with NIH.43
Eventually, major vaccine manufacturers like Johnson & Johnson,
Novavax, Inovio, and Gilead started developing vaccines targeting the
novel coronavirus.44 Even at that point, many commentators remained
concerned that if the outbreak slow[ed] down, industry interest in a
vaccine could plummet. 45
The initial reluctance from the private sector in engaging in
vaccine R&D which now registers as almost infinitesimal within the
timeline of the extended outbreak illustrates the problems
surrounding vaccines from an innovation perspective. Even when
outbreak-induced funding becomes available for expedited R&D,
vaccines remain unappealing as an investment prospect to the players
with the greatest manufacturing ability and the deepest pockets.
While the development and deployment of vaccines against
infectious diseases have led to the eradication of some diseases and
40. U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019
(COVID-19) GLOBAL COVID-19, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/global-covid-19/index.html [https://perma.cc/BT9G-ZSDV] (last updated
Nov. 5, 2020).
41. Nicholas Florko, Major Drug Makers Haven t Stepped Up to Manufacture
NIH Coronavirus Vaccine, Top U.S. Health Official Says (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/02/11/major-drug-makers-havent-stepped-up-tomanufacture-coronavirus-vaccine-top-u-s-health-official-says/
[https://perma.cc/32GG-FX6U].
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Alex Lee, Why We Shouldn t Pin Our Hopes on a Coronavirus Vaccine,
WIRED (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/coronavirus-vaccine-china
[https://perma.cc/9NFK-S5AU].
45. Id.
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while they prevent high levels of morbidity and mortality associated
with many other diseases, most markets for vaccines targeting
infectious diseases are generally considered unprofitable.46 To begin,
the indicated population tends to be smaller47 than populations in
markets for pharmaceutical products targeting prevalent diseases,
including a multitude of cardiovascular, oncological and autoimmune
conditions.48 Moreover, there are long-recognized difficulties in
calculating savings to health systems stemming from vaccine use.49
And even for players motivated to engage in vaccine R&D, there are
hurdles that were largely absent in the polio days. While the golden
age of vaccine development in the mid-twentieth century translated
into numerous new vaccines entering the market, R&D on remaining
targets has become substantially more complex from a scientific
perspective, requiring exponentially higher investment levels than
before.50
These dynamics cause R&D on numerous vaccine targets to be
chronically underfunded.51 This Essay now turns to the default legal
regime that should, in principle, cure some of the imbalances affecting
incentives frameworks for vaccine R&D as Part III will show,
however, that is not the case in practice.

46. ENCOURAGING VACCINE INNOVATION, supra note 15 ( The prevailing
business model prioritizes vaccine candidates with large markets; yet market sizes
are likely smaller for many remaining targets ). For a summary of the characteristics
of vaccines that have traditionally rendered them less attractive from an R&D
perspective, see generally Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines:
Takeaways from Recent Infectious Disease Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. 170, 170
(2020).
47. A recent exception to this rule has been the case of the COVID-19 pandemic,
during which there was pronounced demand and at global level for a vaccine
targeting the underlying pathogen. See, e.g., Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Will End,
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/
03/how-will-coronavirus-end/608719/ [https://perma.cc/6AV8-4WWA]; Laura
Spinney, Coronavirus Vaccine: When Will We Have One?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr.
15, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/15/coronavirus-vaccinewhen-will-we-have-one-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/Y4Y7-N42J].
48. See e.g., Kate Cox, What Are The 10 Biggest Money-Making Prescription
Drugs, And What Do They Treat?, CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/what-are-the-10-biggest-moneymaking-prescription-drugs-and-what-do-they-treat [https://perma.cc/D2YS-2L5Q].
49. See e.g., Mondher Toumi & Walter Ricciardi, The Economic Value of
Vaccination: Why Prevention is Wealth, 3 J. MKT. ACCESS HEALTH POL Y (2015).
50. Id.
51. See Ruth Young et. al., supra note 3, at 1.
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III. VACCINE MARKETS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
As seen above, many types of vaccines needed to prevent or
mitigate the effects of infectious diseases fail to attract appropriate
levels of investment, if any. Because intellectual property remains the
primary legal regime designed to incentivize investment in
underfunded areas, this Essay now turns to the role and shortcomings
of patent regimes in connection with vaccine R&D.
There is an additional moment in the vaccine innovation
ecosystem in which intellectual property frameworks are relevant: as
a vaccine candidate progresses through the R&D pipeline, patent
rights often arise in connection with individual components of a single
vaccine.52 If different, non-cooperating entities patent discrete
components needed to make a vaccine or if an entity holding rights
over an entire vaccine fails to bring it to market intellectual property
may erect new hurdles to the commercialization of vaccines that were
able to overcome shortcomings in incentives frameworks.
Part A briefly summarizes problems related to the incentivesenhancing function of patent regimes, while Part B addresses
problems posed by transactional inefficiencies within patent regimes
covering vaccine technology.
A. Intellectual Property as Incentives
Contemporary intellectual property regimes are often cast as
systems of incentives.53 In exchange for the ability to exclude wouldbe competitors from the market for a period of time, innovators have
an incentive to embark on risky and resource-intensive endeavors that
might otherwise never receive funding.54 Patents embody this

52. The Vaccine Race, supra note 27 at 762 (surveying the rise of an intellectual
property culture surrounding vaccine R&D).
53. See e.g., Stephen M. Maurer, Intellectual Property Incentives: Economics
and Policy Implications, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
1, 1 (Rochelle Dreyfus & Justine Pila, eds., 2018); see also WILLIAM FISHER,
THEORIES
OF
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY,
CYBER
HARV.
(1987),
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf [https://perma.cc/R45K2R57] (highlighting a different framing IP theories complementing the incentives
narrative).
54. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH
POL Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720 (2005) (explaining how this view of intellectual
property has been particularly resonant in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
areas).
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utilitarian ethos perhaps better than any other domain in intellectual
property.55
If the prospective purpose of patents functioned as (at least
nominally) intended in the area of vaccines, then the possibility of
market exclusivity should, to some extent, outweigh the risk and cost
associated with vaccine R&D. Because vaccines are socially desirable,
there would be an alignment between public health imperatives
development, production, and distribution of one of the most cost
effective tools for preventing disease or mitigating its burden and the
catalytic function of the patent system in fields of R&D that can rely
on market prospectivity the least.
In practice, however, the patent system on its own is incapable
of incentivizing sustained R&D on many types of vaccines we
collectively need,56 including vaccines for which the required
scientific knowledge exists prior to the outbreak of an infectious
disease.57 It should be noted that, apart from the historically ingrained
pervasiveness of patent regimes in contemporary innovation
infrastructure,58 there is no particular reason why vaccine R&D should
be best incentivized through intellectual property incentives. After all,
intellectual property offers a transversal mode of promoting
innovation, with the patent system being technology agnostic at least
in its overall design.59
To be sure, vaccines are not the only type of product for which
intellectual property incentives have shown to be insufficient time and

55. See e.g., Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(stating that the encouragement of investment-based risk is the fundamental
purpose of the patent grant, and is based directly on the right to exclude ); F. Scott
Kieff, Property Rights & Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 697 (2001) (noting that [t]he foundation for the American patent system is
purely economic ); see generally ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT
LAW & POL Y 1,1 (7th ed. 2017).
56. See Rutschman, supra note 14.
57. See Ana Santos Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1200, 1219 (2018) (describing the development of an Ebola vaccine
candidate before the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak and how it failed to attract privatesector support for clinical testing).
58. Which, admittedly, is no small feature of the current innovation ecosystem.
59. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (noting that [w]ith very few
exceptions, the [patent] statute does not distinguish between different technologies
in setting and applying legal standards.).
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time again. Other categories include antibiotics,60 orphan diseases,61
and neglected tropical diseases (such as Chagas disease, dengue, or
leishmaniasis).62 Moreover, not all underinvestment in vaccine R&D
is rooted in insufficiency of intellectual property incentives; scientific
complexity in many areas of vaccine R&D has increased substantially
from the heyday of polio research.63
These additional factors further complicate the economics and
dynamics of vaccine R&D. An overview of the current landscape for
vaccine development shows that most R&D efforts64 are currently
centered on cancer vaccines65 precisely one of the more difficult
types of vaccine R&D from a scientific perspective as opposed to
simpler forms of vaccine development, such as vaccines used to target
pathogens causing infectious disease.66
60. See e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Fighting Antibiotic
Resistance: Marrying New Financial Incentives to Meeting Public Health Goals,
HEALTH AFFAIRS. (Sept. 2010) https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377
/hlthaff.2009.0439 [https://perma.cc/FE5H-V7DX].
61. In the United States, orphan diseases are defined as conditions affecting
fewer than 200,000 people. Orphan Products: Hope for People with Rare Diseases,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (Mar. 1, 2018) https://www.fda.gov/drugs/druginformation-consumers/orphan-products-hope-people-rare-diseases
[https://perma.cc/6BC9-H9Z2]; see generally Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414,
96 Stat. 2049 (1983) [https://perma.cc/UTU5-9SNK].
62. Neglected
Tropical
Diseases,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
https://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/
[https://perma.cc/68VX25WX] (last visited June 21, 2020).
63. See Stanley Plotkin et al., The Complexity and Cost of Vaccine
Manufacturing
An Overview, 35 VACCINE 4064, 4066 (2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5518734/ (describing the overall
complexity of vaccine manufacturing); Barney S. Graham, G E Ledgerwood, & G J
Nabel, Vaccine Development in the Twenty‐First Century: Changing Paradigms for
Elusive Viruses, 86 CLINICAL PHARMA. & THERAPEUTICS 234, 235 (2009),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2931821/
[https://perma.cc/YMA2-AQTQ] (noting that [t]he viruses for which new vaccines
are now in development have also become more challenging ); Morven E. Wilkie
& Helen McShane, TB Vaccine Development: Where Are We and Why is it So
Difficult?, 70 THORAX 299, 299 (2015), https://thorax.bmj.com/content/70/3/299
[https://perma.cc/KGA2-LDW2] (exemplifying the scientific challenges in the field
of vaccine R&D targeting tuberculosis).
64. Outside the context of a pandemic like COVID-19.
65. See Cynthia Liu, Global Vaccine Trends: R&D and Market Insights Driving
New
Opportunities,
AM.
CHEMICAL
SOC.
(May
3,
2019),
https://www.cas.org/blog/global-vaccine-trends-rd-and-market-insights-drivingnew-opportunities [https://perma.cc/74X8-V5GR].
66. See generally Susanne Rauch et al., New Vaccine Technologies to Combat
Outbreak
Situations,
9
FRONTIERS
IMMUNOLOGY
(2018),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6156540/pdf/fimmu-09-01963.pdf
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Figure 1: Distribution of vaccine-related substance classes (according
to chemical substance count)67
As a system of incentives, if intellectual property were truly
able to correct for shortcomings in market-driven R&D pipelines, then
we should have relatively robust levels of vaccine R&D in the field of
infectious diseases the group of pathogens causing outbreaks
affecting the health of individuals and communities locally,
transnationally, and now, with diseases like COVID-19, at a global
level.68 Because the toll of these diseases can be enormous, R&D
systems calibrated primarily by public health imperatives would
allocate abundant resources to vaccine R&D in this space. Failing this,
the utilitarian intellectual property narrative would then have the
(describing different types of vaccine technology used in the context of infectious
disease).
67. See generally Cynthia Liu, Global Vaccine Trends: R&D and Market
Insights Driving New Opportunities, AM. CHEMICAL SOC. (May 3, 2019),
https://www.cas.org/blog/global-vaccine-trends-rd-and-market-insights-drivingnew-opportunities [https://perma.cc/42XF-YUF5].
68. See Coronavirus Disease (COVID-2019) Situation Reports, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation
-reports/ [https://perma.cc/VDS2-MRVR] (reporting over 7.5 million cases of
infection and close to 500,000 deaths globally on June 14, 2020).
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patent system artificially create incentives to R&D that would, in
substantial ways, offset the commercially unappealing prospects of
many vaccines targeting infectious diseases.69 However, that has not
been the case.70 Even against the backdrop of the COVID-19
pandemic an event of unprecedented magnitude in the age of
biotechnology the race to develop new vaccines has been both
tempered by profitability considerations71 and renewed discussion
about the need for non-IP incentives.72
It is in this sense that vaccines, as opposed to several other
types of biopharmaceutical products,73 often present would-be funders
and developers with unhappy R&D prospects, particularly in the
field of infectious diseases one of the areas where, paradoxically, the
public health need is often the greatest.
B. Transactional Intellectual Property
Now let us consider the case of vaccine candidates in the
infectious disease space that manage to attract sufficient funding for
the later stages of R&D. This occurs when there is sufficient
momentum behind a particular disease that translates into the
availability of funding. For instance, R&D on malaria vaccines has
69. There are, of course, many other forms of dealing with problems related to
incentives. An emerging solution for incentives problems specific to the field of
vaccines is the formation of public-private partnerships. See generally Margaret
Chon et al., CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (July
25, 2018) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3219930 [https://
perma.cc/XP84-48D3].
70. See e.g. Gary Wong & Xiangguo Qiu, Funding Vaccines for Emerging
Infectious Diseases, HUMAN VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6067896/
[https://perma.cc/8LWH-LGTQ].
71. See e.g. Nicole Wetsman, Health Secretary Alex Azar Won t Promise that a
Coronavirus Vaccine Would Be Affordable, THE VERGE (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/27/21155879/alex-azar-coronavirus-vaccineaffordable-insurance [https://perma.cc/H9VQ-U573]; Gerald Posner, Big Pharma
May Pose an Obstacle to Vaccine Development, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/02/opinion/contributors/pharma-vaccines.html
[https://perma.cc/6X84-QY7R].
72. See e.g. Daniel Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Want a Coronavirus
Vaccine,
Fast?
Here s
a
Solution,
TIME
(Mar.
4,
2020),
https://time.com/5795013/coronavirus-vaccine-prize-challenge/
[https://perma.cc/RX5Z-DLGC] (proposing the creation of an ad hoc prize for the
development of coronavirus vaccines).
73. See supra notes 46 50 and accompanying text.
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received financial support from sources such as the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation.74 This is also what happens when large infectious
disease outbreaks drastically alter the incentives landscape in an
almost perverse way, as recently illustrated by the quick propagation
of COVID-19, which cured the incentives problem almost overnight,
resulting in an extraordinarily populated race to develop vaccines
targeting the emerging pathogen.75
Curing the incentives problem even if temporarily76 does
not necessarily guarantee that scientifically viable vaccines will come
to market in a timely fashion or that they will be made available to
indicated populations at affordable prices. While distinct, these two
types of problems are rooted in the same (potential) malfunction of
intellectual property regimes: it is possible for rightsholders to
(mis)use their exclusionary power in ways that delay or curtail access
to socially valuable goods because the incentives component of
intellectual property, by design, rests on an exclusionary legal
architecture. In this sense, the exclusionary tools used to promote
innovation in the form of rights-as-incentives can be (mis)used at the
transactional level, both when transfers of intellectual property are
required for further development of biopharmaceutical products like
vaccines and at the commercialization stage of fully developed and
licensed products. This Essay now illustrates both problems in turn.
An example of the first scenario transactional issues
affecting transfers of vaccine-related intellectual property during
R&D stages occurred during the 2014 16 Ebola outbreak. It
involved the then-leading Ebola vaccine candidate in the wake of the
2014 15 outbreak for which a small American pharmaceutical
company held a license issued by the Canadian government.77 The
company, NewLink, failed to test the vaccine and seek regulatory
74. See, e.g., Leslie Wroughton, Gates Gives $168 Mln for Malaria Vaccines
Research, REUTERS (Sep. 25, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-unassembly-malariahealth/gates-gives-168-mln-for-malaria-vaccines-researchidUSTRE48O9CD20080925; BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., MALARIA
STRATEGY
OVERVIEW,
https://www.gatesfoundation.org/what-we-do/globalhealth/malaria [https://perma.cc/Q7GL-4VLV] (last visited June 14, 2020).
75. See Thanh et al., supra note 9 and accompanying text.
76. Outbreak-spiked funding tends to thin out fairly quickly, a phenomenon that
often begins even before the outbreak has ended. See Rutschman, IP Preparedness
for Outbreak Diseases, supra note 57, at 1253 (addressing this problem with
reference to Ebola R&D in the later stages of the 2014-16 pandemic).
77. See generally Rutschman, supra note 57.
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approval in the years prior to the outbreak as required by the terms of
the license.78 Moreover, as the outbreak unfolded, the company
maintained the same course for a few months neither developing the
vaccine nor licensing to another company.79 NewLink initially paid
the Canadian government $205,000 for the license.80 When it finally
agreed to transfer the rights over the vaccine candidate to another
company, NewLink received $30 million, with the possibility of an
additional $20 million payment should the vaccine candidate enter
clinical trials.81
This example illustrates a problem stemming from the
concentration of patent-protected technology in a single entity
unwilling or incapable of developing it even when the incentives
problem has been solved. Unlike COVID-19, most outbreaks so far
have been more temporally and/or geographically limited; therefore,
the failure to develop promising vaccine technology can come at a
heightened cost in the context of infectious diseases. Patent hold-up82
during an outbreak, even if momentary, happens at a time of spiked
funding, which is traditionally short-lived. Thus, rights-as-incentives
that were granted for utilitarian purposes now stand in the way of
maximization of funding and R&D goodwill.83
The second type of problem that might occur at the
transactional level concerns the pricing of, or access to, a vaccine that
has overcome both the incentives problem and potential transactional
problems during R&D stages. Even if the development and licensure
of a new vaccine constitutes a significant achievement from a
78. Denise Grady, Ebola Vaccine, Ready for Test, Sat on the Shelf, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/health/without-lucrativemarket-potential-ebola-vaccine-was-shelved-for-years.html [https://perma.cc/EW
92-YV54].
79. Lisa Schnirring, NewLink, Merck Deal Boosts Prospects for Ebola Vaccine,
CIDRAP
(Nov.
24,
2014),
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/newsperspective/2014/11/newlink-merck-deal-boosts-prospects-ebola-vaccine
[https://perma.cc/R7QQ-2G42].
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. For a general overview of the phenomenon of patent hold-up, see Thomas F.
Cotter et al., Demystifying Patent Holdup, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1501
(2019).
83. As well as possibly expedited regulatory review pathways available to
products needed to target the pathogen causing an outbreak. See generally Stuart L.
Nightingale et al., Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to Enable Use of Needed
Products in Civilian and Military Emergencies, United States, 13 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1046, 1046 (2007).
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scientific and technological perspective, that achievement will be
significantly thwarted at a minimum from a public health
perspective if that vaccine is not made available to those who need
it. Yet, for the past several years, there have been recurrent concerns
that emerging vaccines for infectious diseases might be priced in ways
that effectively exclude segments of indicated populations from
receiving it.
This was the case with Zika vaccine candidates in the wake of
the 2015 16 outbreak.84 During this time, scholars and policymakers
alike worried that an exclusive license for the then-leading Zika
vaccine candidate would grant a single company the de facto ability to
price out poorer indicated populations.85 At this time, as dozens of
vaccines targeting COVID-19 are under development, it is concerning
that little has emerged to assure the public at large of the ultimate
affordability of the vaccines. If anything, the opposite has happened.86
In late February 2020, when asked at a congressional hearing
whether potential coronavirus vaccines would be affordable for
anyone who needs it, Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex
Azar replied, We would want to ensure that we work to make it
affordable, but we can t control that price because we need the private
sector to invest Price controls won t get us there. 87
This statement pitches the incentives function of intellectual
property against the exercise of exclusionary rights in the
biopharmaceutical arena as if the two were not interdependent.
Moreover, it implies that the rights-as-incentives do not have to be
balanced first within the intellectual property universe and second

84. See generally Ana Santos Rutschman, Vaccine Licensure in the Public
Interest: Lessons from the Development of the U.S. Army Zika Vaccine, 127 YALE
L. J. F. 651, 651 (2018).
85. See e.g., Ed Silverman, The Battle Over a Fair Price for Zika Vaccines,
STAT (May 18, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-battle-overa-fair-price-for-zika-vaccines/. R&D on this vaccine candidate has, in the meantime,
stopped. See e.g., Helen Braswell, Sanofi Quietly Pulls the Plug on its Zika Vaccine
Project, STAT (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/09/02/sanofi-zikavaccine/.
86. See Wetsman, supra note 71.
87. Isabel Togoh, Health Secretary Alex Azar Refuses to Guarantee Coronavirus
Vaccine Would Be Affordable For All, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2020, 8:30 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/isabeltogoh/2020/02/27/health-secretary-alex-azarrefuses-to-guarantee-coronavirus-vaccine-would-be-affordable-forall/#794efe16490c [https://perma.cc/KD3A-3B2E].
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when measured against larger legal and policy goals and structures,
including public health needs.
The recurrence of transactional malfunctions regarding
vaccine technology in the field of infectious diseases is especially
problematic as recent outbreaks remind us of the likely and imminent
increase of our collective need for new vaccines as increased travel
patterns,88 globalization,89 and climate change90 pose renewed
challenges to public health. The following section considers how less
property-centric treatments of intellectual property may help us work
through some of the transactional problems we currently face in the
field of vaccines.
This is not to say that there are not mechanisms embedded in
intellectual property laws designed to curb the forms of intellectual
property (mis)use surveyed above from patent-specific provisions
addressing the licensure of publicly funded goods91 or allowing
government interventions92 to compulsory licensing mechanisms
derived from international intellectual property laws.93 Rather, the
point of this Essay is to suggest that we consider additional solutions,
especially in light of the fact that many of these balancing mechanisms
embedded into the legal architecture are seldom used (if used at all)94
88. See generally Mary E. Wilson, Travel and the Emergence of Infectious
Diseases,
1
EMERGING
INFECTIOUS
DISEASES
39,
39
(1995),
https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/1/2/95-0201_article.
89. See generally INST. MED., THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INFECTIOUS
DISEASE EMERGENCE AND CONTROL: WORKSHOP SUMMARY, STACEY KNOBLER ET
AL., EDITORS, NAT T ACADEMIES PRESS (2006), 1(Stacey Knobler et al. eds., 2006).
90. See generally U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, , CLIMATE
EFFECTS ON HEALTH, https://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/effects/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/55FM-MACT].
91. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(1) (2012); see also Rutschman, supra note 84.
92. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1498; see generally Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription
for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18
YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 308 (2016) (describing the applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1498
to pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical products).
93. E.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
33 I.L.M. 319, 333-34 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Article 31]; see Frederick M.
Abbott & Rudolf Van Puymbroeck, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 61 WORLD BANK
WORKING PAPER 51 (2005).
94. As is the case of compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. Other examples
include government march-in rights associated with federally funded innovation.
See generally Ryan Whalen, The Bayh-Dole Act & Public Rights in Federally
Funded Inventions: Will the Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
1083, 1083 (2015).
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in the United States. The topic this Essay next turns to thus explores
an alternative95 way of lessening the detrimental impact of overly
exclusionary effects often associated with the transactional side of
intellectual property rights in the field of vaccine R&D. Specifically,
one alternative is to adopt liability regimes that place less emphasis on
the proprietary contours of patents by allowing the use of protected
goods against the payment of just compensation to the patent holder.
While exploring this topic entails some reference to the broader nature
of intellectual property rights, and in particular a nod to the now
storied yet unsettled debate surrounding the property question in
patent law, this Essay addresses these questions narrowly with
reference to the highly idiosyncratic field of vaccines.
IV. PROPERTY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES
In previous work, the Author has suggested that liability
regimes constitute an overlooked solution to transactional problems
affecting critical technology essential to the development of goods
needed to address pressing public health needs.96 Here, the Author
develops that theme by connecting it to the ongoing debate on the
nature of intellectual property rights, as the adoption of liability
regimes implies a departure from strong, proprietary
conceptualizations of intellectual property rights. Part A will provide
an overview of property-informed conceptions of patent rights in
American caselaw. Part B will explain how liability regimes may coexist within proprietary frameworks and how sketches out how
liability regimes can be implemented in the field of vaccines to help
mitigate transactional problems during the later stages of vaccine
R&D.
A. IP as Property
The Patent Act establishes that patents shall have the
attributes of personal property. 97 The extent to which patent rights
should be regarded as a form of property proper as opposed to a

95. And cumulative.
96. Rutschman, supra note 27, 765 69.
97. 35 U. S. C. §261 (2013).
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distinguishable, more elusive legal form has long prompted intense
debate.98
The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have repeatedly
emphasized the property dimensions of intellectual property rights and
in particular of patents. In United States v. American Bell Telephone
Co., Justice Miller framed patents as private property of the
patentee. 99
In Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, a Supreme Court case
involving a patent covering Mason jars, Justice Swayne stated that [a]
patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The
right rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by
the same sanctions. 100 This property-coasting approach has persisted
to this day. Just over a century after Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.,
writing for the majority in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Chief Justice Rehnquist
characterized patents as a long-recognized species of property. 101
Many of the analyses of the nature of patents as a form of
property have arisen in the context of courts discussions of the
Takings Doctrine and its applicability to intellectual property.102 For
instance, the Federal Circuit has applied the three-prong test that the
Supreme Court developed in Penn Central to identify regulatory

98. For an overview of the scholarly debate see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 108, 108 (1990);
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm,
54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004); Stephen L. Carter, Does it Matter Whether Intellectual
Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993).
99. U.S. v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888); see also Brown v.
Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 197 (1856); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman,
169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898) (cited in Oil States, infra note 110).
100. Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876).
101. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 642 (1999).
102. The articulation between intellectual property rights and the takings clause
is often traced back to Madison s expansive framing of property: Government is
instituted to protect property of every sort (emphasis added). James Madison,
Property, PAPERS (Mar. 29, 1792), at 266. For a discussion of the evolution of the
treatment of patents in connection with the Takings Clause, see generally Adam
Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of
Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007); see also Thomas F.
Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?,
50 FLA. L. REV. 529 (1998); Gregory Dolin & Irena D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719 (2016).
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takings of real property103 to cases involving patents.104 Citing
Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.,105 in Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, Judge
Newman wrote that [i]t is beyond reasonable debate that patents are
property. 106 Grounded on this view of patent rights, the court went on
to apply the Penn Central factors to analyze due process issues in the
context of patent reexamination.107
In 2015, in Horne v. Department of Agriculture, the Supreme
Court reiterated the idea that, for purposes of application of the
Takings Clause, there is no differentiation between real and personal
property.108 Gregory Dolin and Irina Manta have argued that this
decision subjects patents to the Takings Clause.109
Most recently, while examining the constitutionality of inter
partes review an adversarial form of post-issuance administrative
proceeding allowing the Patent and Trademark Office to reexamine
patent grants the Supreme Court in Oil States expressly declined to
address the property question.110 In upholding the constitutionality of
inter partes review, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority,
emphasized the narrowness of the holding and stated that Oil States
should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not
property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings
Clause. 111

103. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
104. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
105. And borrowing from Jeremy Bentham s utilitarian worldview of property
and property rights. Id. at 599.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 603 (applying the Penn Central standard to [the appellant s] property
rights ).
108. Horne v. Dep t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) ( Nothing in the text
or history of the Takings Clause, or our precedents, suggests that the rule is any
different when it comes to appropriation of personal property ).
109. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 102, at 771 72. Previously, in Zoltek, the
Federal Circuit had concluded that the Takings Clause did not apply to patents.
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Camilla Hrdy
and Ben Picozzi, however, have made the case that, while the Supreme Court has
recognized that trade secrets have a property-like nature, it has not definitively
determined that patents should be regarded on equal footing with real property even
for purposes of applying the Takings Clause. See Camilla A. Hrdy & Ben Picozzi,
The AIA is Not a Taking: A Response to Dolin & Manta, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
ONLINE 472, 475 (2016).
110. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct.
1365, 1370 (2018).
111. Id. at 1379.
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In reaching the conclusion that inter partes review does not
violate the Constitution by extinguishing private property rights
through a non-Article III forum without a jury, 112 the Court examined
the nature and characteristics of intellectual property rights from a
different viewpoint. The Court distinguished between public and
private rights and stated that [p]atents convey only a specific form
of property right a public franchise, with inter partes review falling
squarely within the public-rights doctrine. 113
Thus, judicial forays into queries about the nature of
intellectual property have tended to emphasize the property
components of patent rights. While consistent with the statutory
language and framework, this emphasis does not exclude the
possibility of regarding patents as a differentiated form of property
including viewing patents as grants or public franchises that are best
described in non-property terms. By reserving the property question
in Oil States, the Supreme Court left the door open to worldviews of
intellectual property that are not centered on property features.
Moreover, even if patents were to be deemed a form of
property proper or essentially analogizable to property the cases
described above, as well as their progeny, have resorted to the property
analogy predominantly in the context of applying the Takings Clause.
This approach suggests that courts are primarily concerned with
instances in which the economic dimensions traditionally associated
with patent-attributable exclusivity are lessened. As seen in the
following section, those concerns can be addressed even in instances
in which liability regimes allow competitors to use patented
technology namely through principles of fair compensation.

112. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at *i, Oil States Energy Servs. v. Greene s
Energy Grp., 138 S.Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16 712).
113. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC, 138 S. Ct. at 1373, 1375. This distinction is
not new in Supreme Court jurisprudence: the grant of a patent has long been regarded
as the exercise of a public right; in United States v. American Bell Telephone Co.,
for instance, the Court characterized this grant as the act of an administrative agency
which takes public rights of immense value and bestow[s] them upon the
patentee. United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888).

132

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 7

B. Liability Regimes in IP: A Solution for Vaccine R&D During
Public Health Crises?
Liability rules,114 also known as take-and-pay regimes,
allow follow-on innovators to pay an objectively determined value
for someone else s entitlement. As Jack Balkin and Ian Ayres have put
it, liability rules give at least one party an option to take an
entitlement non-consensually and pay the entitlement owner some
exercise price. 115 Consider the case of the Ebola vaccine candidate
described in Part II.116 Under property rules, a follow-on innovator
wishing to quickly develop and test a vaccine candidate as early as
possible during an outbreak would need to not only obtain NewLink s
permission but also to support the transaction costs associated with the
bargaining and licensure processes, which are likely to spread over a
significant period of time. Under a system of liability rules, however,
the same follow-on innovator would be able to non-consensually
take the technology needed to make this vaccine candidate upon
payment of an objectively determined value.
Liability regimes thus accomplish two things. They eliminate
the threshold question of whether a patentee will even negotiate a
license in the first place. And they lower transaction costs by reducing
the bargaining process to a determination of the value of the
entitlement.
These features of liability regimes render them especially apt
to facilitate certain transfers of technology during situations of public
health crisis particularly in the case of severe or pandemic outbreaks
of infectious diseases. From a legal perspective, because the Supreme
Court has reserved the property question, there is no doctrinal or
precedential impediment to recognizing that patent regimes, or at least
certain aspects thereof, are not completely analogizable to property
regimes. From a policy perspective, infusing some pockets of patent
law and practice with liability features or micro-liability regimes
would result in a nimbler legal architecture for innovators during
periods of public health crisis. And from a political economy
114. As opposed to property rules, in the Calabresi-Melamed formulation. See
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
115. Jack M. Balkin & Ian Ayres, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L. J. 703, 704 (1996).
116. See generally supra notes 77 81 and accompanying text.
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perspective, because the approach proposed in this Essay is limited to
very specific sets of technology needed for expedited vaccine R&D
during abnormal public health circumstances, the disruption to
established interests would be relatively moderate and limited in both
scope and time.
This Essay does not support the view that a liability regime is
desirable for all features of vaccine innovation. As a form of
technology based on the weakening or killing of a pathogen, vaccines
constitute a fairly old form of technology.117 Within the field of
vaccines, however, many components of contemporary vaccine
technology (such as certain adjuvants), as well as emerging vaccine
platform technology118 (such as mRNA-based vaccines),119 are the
product of much more complex R&D processes than the ones
associated with vaccine innovation through most of the twentieth
century. The Author has contended elsewhere that liability regimes,
even in situations of pronounced health care need, should be restricted
to low hanging fruit: simpler forms of vaccine technology not the
latest advancements in the field of vaccinology, immunology, and
related fields.120 The reason behind this distinction is twofold. First, it
acknowledges the political economy of contemporary innovation in
biotech, which depends in significant part on the engagement of the
private sector.121 And second, it is mindful of the fact that the adoption
of an explicit liability regime in patent law even if restricted to a subsector of R&D occurring during formally declared public health

117. See Rutschman, The Vaccine Race, at 738. See also generally Alexandra
Minna Stern & Howard Markel, The History of Vaccines and Immunization:
Familiar Patterns, New Challenges, 24 HEALTH AFF. 611 (2005).
118. See Vaccine Platforms: State of the Field and Looming Challenges, JOHNS
HOPKINS CTR. FOR HEALTH SECURITY (2019), https://www.centerforhealthsecurity
.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2019/190423-OPP-platform-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VZ2F-QJ8J] (adopting the Webster Dictionary definition of
platform as a vehicle used for a particular purpose or to carry a usually specified
type of equipment. ); see also WHO EXPERT COMMITTEE ON BIOLOGICAL
STANDARDIZATION: SIXTY-EIGHT REPORT 95 (WHO Technology Report Series, No.
1011 2018) (defining the concept as a production technology with which different
viral vectored vaccines are produced by incorporating heterologous genes for
different proteins into an identical viral vector backbone ).
119. See Norberto Pardi et al., mRNA Vaccines A New Era in Vaccinology, 17
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 261, 261 (2018).
120. See Rutschman, Vaccine Race, 760 762.
121. See Liza Vertinsky et al., The Problem with Relying on Profits to Produce
Pandemic Drugs, ___ (forthcoming, 2020) (manuscript on file with author).
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crises would constitute an exceptional legal regime and as such
should be designed as narrowly as possible.
The ongoing COVID-19 vaccine race illustrates the need for
this distinction. As of mid-April 2020, over 100 R&D projects
existed.122 Some of these projects relied on older forms of vaccine
development such as inactivation or attenuation of the virus.123 Yet
others relied on DNA and RNA vaccine technology,124 which
constitute a recent development in vaccine R&D and are still in the
early stages of development.125 For further context, consider how the
World Health Organization has described the emergence of DNA
vaccine technology as opposed to pre-existing types of vaccine R&D:
For over a hundred years vaccination has been
[a]ffected by one of two approaches: either introducing
specific antigens against which the immune system
reacts directly; or introducing live attenuated infectious
agents that replicate within the host without causing
disease synthesize the antigens that subsequently prime
the immune system. Recently, a radically new
approach to vaccination has been developed. It
involves the direct introduction into appropriate tissues
of a plasmid containing the DNA sequence encoding
the antigen(s) against which an immune response is
sought, and relies on the in situ production of the target
antigen. This approach offers a number of potential
advantages over traditional approaches 126
A liability regime would be appropriate for less recent forms
of vaccine technology or components thereof, not for emerging ones.
122. See Tung et al., supra note 9, at 305.
123. Id.
124. Id.
See
also
DNA
Vaccines,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
https://www.who.int/biologicals/areas/vaccines/dna/en/ [https://perma.cc/8SYG22BU] (last visited Jul. 10, 2020); Laura Blackburn, RNA Vaccines: An Introduction,
PHG FOUND. (Oct. 2018), https://www.phgfoundation.org/documents/rna-vaccinesan-introduction-briefing-note.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWJ7-GPP8].
125. See Tung et al., supra note 9, at 305; see also DNA Vaccines, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/biologicals/areas/vaccines/dna/en/ [https://
perma.cc/8SYG-22BU] (last visited Jul. 10, 2020); Laura Blackburn, RNA
Vaccines: An Introduction, PHG FOUND. (Oct. 2018), https://www.phgfoundation
.org/documents/rna-vaccines-an-introduction-briefing-note.pdf [https://perma.
cc/SWJ7-GPP8].
126. DNA Vaccines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/biologicals
/areas/vaccines/dna/en/ [https://perma.cc/8SYG-22BU] (last visited Jul. 10, 2020).
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For instance, the vaccine candidate that the U.S. Army developed in a
matter of months during the 2015-16 Zika outbreak, ZPIV (Zika
purified inactivated virus),127 was based on pre-existing vaccine
technology that the Army developed in connection with a different
virus in the Zika family.128 Thus, long-established forms of vaccine
technology can be quickly used to target emerging pathogens, and
limiting a liability regime to some forms of vaccine technology and
even a limited number of components is not incompatible with
covering a significant amount of technology, while preserving the
status quo of the vaccine innovation ecosystem for players involved in
evolving forms of vaccine R&D.
Having considered the scope of the proposed liability regime
approach, this Essay concludes by outlining possibilities for the
establishment of such a regime. First, in line with the restrictive nature
of the proposal, the liability regime would only apply to a limited set
of technologies needed in vaccine R&D for infectious diseases in the
event of a public health crisis. An entity (or a combination of entities)
in the public heath space would make both the determination of the
components integrated in this regime and the qualification of public
health crisis. Examples of these entities include the U.S. National
Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
or the World Health Organization. The formal event that would trigger
the activation of the liability could be a declaration of a public health
crisis for instance, a declaration of public health emergency by the
Department of Health and Human Services129 or a declaration of a
public health emergency of international concern by the World Health
Organization.130

127. See, e.g., Trials Show Inactivated Zika Virus Vaccines is Safe and
Immunogenic, NAT L INST. OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://www.niaid.nih.gov/news-events/trials-show-inactivated-zika-virus-vaccinesafe-and-immunogenic [https://perma.cc/6HPK-LEBL].
128. See id; see also Rutschman, supra note 84, at 654. For a timeline of this
particular R&D project see Rutschman, supra note 84.
129. Public Health Emergency Declaration, U.S. DEP T. OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/Pages/phedeclaration.aspx [https
://perma.cc/JBL4-TDYH] (last updated Nov. 26, 2019).
130. IHR Procedures Concerning Public Health Emergencies of International
Concern
(PHEIC),
HEALTH
ORG.,
WORLD
https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/pheic/en/ [https://perma.cc/X4AH-A3TN] (last
visited Jul. 10, 2020).
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Second, a taking of vaccine technology under the liability
regime a duration that could be established to match the duration of
the formally declared public health emergency would be subject to
the payment of just compensation.131 In an ideal formulation, the
objectively determined value of the liability entitlement would be
established ex ante to reduce uncertainty, friction between original and
follow-on innovators, and the likelihood necessary court intervention.
This ex ante determination could be set in the form of a price menu.
Instead of a fixed price, the menu could also be implemented
through the adoption of a formula, which could be used ex post by the
parties.132
And third, the most straightforward way to implement such a
regime would be through legislative intervention. This could be
accomplished by enacting a law that either defines which vaccinerelated technology components are subject to a liability regime or
grants a particular institutional actor this definitional power.133 This
suggestion mirrors what happened in the case of the priority review
vouchers currently administered by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, which apply to selected diseases primarily
neglected tropical diseases and were originally defined by Congress
but later expanded on as public health emergencies arose.134
As noted above, applying liability rules furthers economic
efficiency by reducing bargaining uncertainty and transaction costs.
Furthermore, a regime like the one sketched in this Essay would be
beneficial from a distributive justice perspective because it would
facilitate the development of, and access to, critical health
technologies that are sorely needed to improve preparedness in an era
of increasing globalized outbreaks of infectious diseases.

131. See generally Balkin & Ayres, supra note 115 and accompanying text.
132. The exact formulation of the price menu would be best developed by
experts in economics and other relevant fields.
133. Such as the case of the agencies and international organization alluded to
above. Supra notes 129 130 and accompanying text.
134. See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Priority Review Voucher Program at the
FDA: From Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st Century Cures Act, 26 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 71, 71 (2017).

